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Abstract
Empirical tests of direct revelation games of strategy-proof social choice functions
show behavior in these games can approximate suboptimal mutual best responses. We
determine that this worst case scenario for the operation of these mechanisms is only
likely to be observed when the social choice function violates a non-bossiness condition
and information is not interior. Our analysis is based on an empirical approach to the
refinement of Nash equilibrium that we introduce, and the characterization of direct
robust full implementation based on this solution concept. Experimental and empirical
evidence on these games supports our findings.
JEL classification: C72, D47, D91.
Keywords: behavioral mechanism design; empirical equilibrium; robust mechanism
design; strategy-proofness.
1 Introduction
Strategy proofness, a coveted property in market design, requires that truthful reports be
dominant strategies in the simultaneous direct revelation game associated with a social
choice function (scf). Despite the theoretical appeal of this property, experimental and em-
pirical evidence suggests that when an scf satisfying this property is operated, agents may
persistently exhibit weakly dominated behavior. This includes experiments with diverse
mechanisms (Coppinger et al., 1980; Kagel et al., 1987; Kagel and Levin, 1993; Harstad,
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2000; Attiyeh et al., 2000; Chen and So¨nmez, 2006; Cason et al., 2006; Healy, 2006; Andreoni
et al., 2007; Li, 2017), survey evidence from national level matching platforms (Rees-Jones,
2017; Hassidim et al., 2020), and empirical evidence from school choice mechanisms (Arte-
mov et al., 2020; Chen and Pereyra, 2019; Shorrer and So´va´go´, 2019). More strikingly,
several studies have documented approximate suboptimal equilibria of these games (e.g.,
Cason et al. (2006); Healy (2006); Andreoni et al. (2007); see also Sec. 6 for a detailed analy-
sis). That is, persistent weakly dominated behavior that approaches mutual best responses
and produces with positive probability outcomes that are different from those intended by
the social choice function. The purpose of this paper is to understand this phenomenon.
That is, our objective is to unveil the conditions under which this worst case scenario for
the operation of a strategy-proof social choice function can happen.
Our study contributes to the growing literature that, motivated by empirical evidence,
studies which strategy-proof scfs admit implementation by means of mechanisms that have
additional incentives properties. This literature has identified the conditions in which
strategy-proof games have no sub-optimal equilibria (Saijo et al., 2007). It has also iden-
tified scfs that admit implementation by an extensive-form dominant strategy mechanism
in which an agent’s choice of a dominant strategy is simpler than in the scf’s simultane-
ous direct revelation mechanism (Li, 2017; Pycia and Troyan, 2019). In many problems of
interest these requirements lead to impossibilities (see Sec. 2 for details). Moreover, the
empirical evidence against strategy-proof scfs is not universal for all scfs that violate these
conditions. Thus, our study offers a fundamental categorization of strategy-proof scfs in
the environments for which the further requirements of Saijo et al. (2007), Li (2017), and
Pycia and Troyan (2019) cannot be met.
To understand why some suboptimal equilibria of strategy-proof games are empirically
relevant, it is natural to analyze them based on an equilibrium refinement. These theories
aim to select the Nash equilibria that are plausible in a game. Unfortunately, the most
prominent refinements in the literature are silent about the nature of this phenomenon.
They either implicitly or explicitly assume admissibility, i.e., that weakly dominated be-
havior is not plausible (from the seminal tremble-based refinements of Selten (1975) and
Myerson (1978), to their most recent forms in Milgrom and Mollner (2017, 2018) and Fu-
denberg and He (2018); see also Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and van Damme (1991) for
a survey).1
We propose an alternative path to refine Nash equilibria. It allows us to understand the
1Economists have seldom challenged admissibility. There are three notable exceptions. Nachbar (1990)
and Dekel and Scotchmer (1992) observed that weakly dominated behavior can result from the evolution of
strategies that are updated by means of simple intuitive rules. Perhaps the study that is most skeptical of
admissibility is Samuelson (1992), who shows that it has no solid epistemic foundation in all games.
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incentives for truthful revelation across different strategy-proof mechanisms and to come
to terms with the existing experimental and empirical evidence. Our refinement is based
on an inverse approach to that taken by the existing tremble-based equilibrium refinements
literature. At a high level, one can describe these refinements as follows. Based on a
particular game in which a Nash equilibrium is intuitively implausible, the researchers
identify a property that is not satisfied by this equilibrium but is always satisfied by some
equilibrium in every possible game. Our proposal is to work in the opposite order. That
is, we begin our quest by identifying a property of behavior that has empirical support and
work our ways backward to identify the equilibria that can possibly be observed, at least
approximately, if behavior will satisfy this property.
More formally, we articulate an empirical approach to refine Nash equilibria. That is, we
consider a researcher who samples behavior in normal-form games and constructs a theory
that explains it. The researcher then determines the plausibility of Nash equilibria based
on the empirical content of the theory by requiring that Nash equilibria be in its closure.
More precisely, if a Nash equilibrium cannot be approximated to an arbitrary degree by
the empirical content of the researcher’s theory, it is identified as implausible or unlikely
to be observed. One can give this approach a static or dynamic interpretation. First,
it simply articulates the logical implication of the hypothesis that the researcher’s theory
is well specified, for this hypothesis is refuted by the observation of a Nash equilibrium
that is flagged as implausible. Alternatively, suppose that the researcher hypothesizes that
behavior will eventually converge to a Nash equilibrium through an unmodeled evolutionary
process that produces a path of behavior that is consistent with her theory. Then, the
researcher can also conclude that the only Nash equilibria that are relevant are those that
are not flagged as implausible.
To make this empirical approach concrete we identify a non-parametric theory for which
there is empirical support. We consider a hypothetical environment in which a researcher
observes payoffs, controls the information available to each agent, and samples behavior.2
This framework encompasses the experimental environments with monetary payoffs and
the observable game matrix framework used for the foundation of Nash equilibrium by
Harsanyi (1973). We observe that a common factor in the noisy best response models that
have been proposed to account for observed behavior in these environments—either sampled
or hypothetical as in Harsanyi (1973), require consistency with an a priori restriction for
which there is empirical support, weak payoff monotonicity.3 This property of the full
2We believe this is the right benchmark to articulate our empirical approach, for the structural theories
for the analysis of data when payoffs are not observable usually make equilibrium selection identifying
assumptions. Our objective is to obtain these selections from basic testable hypotheses.
3These models include the exchangeable randomly perturbed payoff models (Harsanyi, 1973; van Damme,
1991), the control cost model (van Damme, 1991), the monotone structural QRE model (McKelvey and
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profile of empirical distributions of play in a game requires that for each agent, differences
in behavior reveal differences in expected utility. That is, between two alternative actions
for an agent, say a and b, if the agent plays a with higher frequency than b, it is because
given what the other agents are doing, a has higher expected utility than b (see Sec. 3 for
an intuitive example).
Empirical equilibrium is the refinement so defined based on weak payoff monotonicity,
i.e., the one that selects each Nash equilibrium for which there is a sequence of weakly
payoff monotone behavior that converges to it.
Empirical equilibria exist for each finite game and may admit weakly dominated be-
havior. Indeed, the limits of logistic QRE (as the noisy best responses converge to best
responses) are empirical equilibria (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). It is known that for
each finite game these limits exist and that they may admit weakly dominated behavior
(McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). Furthermore, empirical equilibrium is independent from the
refinements previously defined in the literature. Determining this has a technical nature,
which we have pursued in a companion paper (Velez and Brown, 2019b) (Sec. 2 summarizes
these findings). Since our interest in this paper is the analysis of strategy-proof mechanisms,
we concentrate on the application of the empirical equilibrium refinement to these games. It
is worth noting that the games we analyze give us the chance to show the full power of this
refinement to rule out implausible behavior without ruling out behavior that is prevalent
in experiments.
We submit that we can considerably advance our understanding of the direct revelation
game of a strategy-proof scf by calculating its empirical equilibria. On the one hand, suppose
that we find that for a certain game each empirical equilibrium is truthful equivalent. Then,
we learn that as long as empirical distributions of play are weakly payoff monotone, behavior
will never approximate a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, if we find that
some empirical equilibria are not truthful equivalent, this alerts us about the possibility
that we may plausibly observe persistent behavior that generates sub-optimal outcomes
and approximates mutual best responses.
We present two main results. The first is that non-bosiness in welfare-outcome—i.e., the
requirement on an scf that no agent be able to change the outcome without changing her own
welfare—is necessary and sufficient to guarantee that for each common prior type space,
each empirical equilibrium of the direct revelation game of a strategy-proof scf in a private
values environment, produces, with certainty, the truthful outcome (Theorem 1). The
Palfrey, 1995), and the regular QRE models (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1996; Goeree et al., 2005). The common
characteristic of these models that make them suitable for our purpose is that their parametric forms are
independent of the game in which they are applied, and have been successful in replicating comparative
statics in a diversity of games (Goeree et al., 2005). See Goeree et al. (2018) for a related discussion.
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second is that the requirement that a strategy-proof scf have essentially unique dominant
strategies, characterizes this form of robust implementation for type spaces with full support
(Theorem 2). The sharp predictions of our theorems are consistent with experimental and
empirical evidence on strategy-proof mechanisms (Sec. 6). Indeed, they are in line with some
of the most puzzling evidence on the second-price auction, a strategy-proof mechanism
that violates non-bosiness but whose dominant strategies are unique. Deviations from
truthful behavior are persistently observed when this mechanism is operated, but mainly
for information structures for which agents’ types are common information (Andreoni et al.,
2007).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 places our contribution in
the context of the literature. Section 3 presents the intuition of our results illustrated for
the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism and the second-price auction, two cornerstones
of the market design literature. Section 4 introduces the model. Section 5 presents our main
results. Section 6 contrasts our results with experimental and empirical evidence. Section 7
contrasts them with the characterizations of robust full implementation (Bergemann and
Morris, 2011; Saijo et al., 2007; Adachi, 2014) with which one can draw an informative
parallel, and discusses our restriction to direct revelation mechanisms. Section 8 concludes.
The Appendix collects all proofs.
2 Related literature
2.1 Refinements
The idea to refine Nash equilibrium by means of the proximity to plausible behavior has some
precedents in the literature. Harsanyi (1973) addressed the plausibility of Nash equilibrium
itself by approximating in each game at least one Nash equilibrium by means of behavior
that is unambiguosly determined by utility maximization in additive randomly perturbed
payoff models with vanishing perturbations. The main difference with our construction is
that the theory in which we base approximation is non-parametric and disciplined by an a
priori restriction that allows us to narrow the set of equilibria that can be approximated.4
Our refinement is also closely related to Rosenthal (1989)’s approximation of equilibria by
a particular linear random choice model that evolves towards best responses and is defined
only in games with two actions, van Damme (1991)’s firm equilibria and vanishing control
costs approachable equilibria, and McKelvey and Palfrey (1996)’s logistic QRE approach-
able equilibria. These authors propose parametric theories to account for deviations from
4Each Nash equilibrium can be approached by a sequence of behavior in Harsanyi (1973)’s randomly
perturbed payoff models with vanishing perturbations (Velez and Brown, 2019b).
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utility maximization in games and require equilibria to be approachable by the empirical
content of these theories. Behavior generated by each of these theories satisfies weak payoff
monotonicity. Thus they generate subrefinements of empirical equilibrium.
These previous attempts to refine Nash equilibrium by means of approachability were
never studied as stand alone refinements, however. Indeed, van Damme (1991) developed
firm equilibria and vanishing control costs approachable equilibria as basic frameworks to
add restrictions and provide foundations for other equilibrium refinements that do eliminate
weakly dominated behavior, e.g., Selten (1975)’s perfect equilibria. Moreover, McKelvey
and Palfrey (1996) only mention logistic QRE approachable equilibria as a theoretical possi-
bility. It has never been studied or used in any application. Thus, a significant contribution
of our work is to show that a robust non-parametric generalization of these refinements can
actually inform us about the incentives for truthful revelation in dominant strategy games
and explain well established regularities in data.
Determining whether empirical equilibrium coincides with any of the refinements defined
by means of approachability in previous literature is interesting, but outside the scope of
this paper. We have pursued this task in a companion paper (Velez and Brown, 2019b).
Remarkably, there is a meaningful difference between every possible refinement based on
monotone additive randomly perturbed payoff models (e.g., firm equilibria, logistic QRE
approachable equilibria) and empirical equilibrium. In particular, for each action space in
which at least one agent has at least three actions, one can construct a payoff matrix for
which each of these refinements selects a strict subset of empirical equilibria. Empirical
equilibrium coincides with those that can be approached by behavior in a general form of
vanishing control costs games. It is not clear whether the approximation can always be
done by means of the parametric form of approximation by behavior in control costs games
proposed by van Damme (1991).
2.2 Strategy-proofness
The literature on strategy-proof mechanisms was initiated by Gibbard (1973) and Sat-
terthwaite (1975) who proved that this property implies dictatorship when there are at
least three outcomes and preferences are unrestricted. The theoretical literature that fol-
lowed has shown that this property is also restrictive in economic environments, but can
be achieved by reasonable scfs in restricted preference domains (see Barbera, 2010, for a
survey). Among these are the VCG mechanisms for the choice of an outcome with transfer-
able utility, which include the second-price auction of an object and the Pivotal mechanism
for the selection of a public project (see Green and Laffont, 1977, and references therein);
the TTC mechanism for the reallocation of indivisible goods (Shapley and Scarf, 1974);
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the Student Proposing Deferred Acceptance (SPDA) mechanism for the allocation of school
seats based on priorities (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003); the
median voting rules for the selection of an outcome in an interval with satiable preferences
(Moulin, 1980); and the Uniform rule in the rationing of a good with satiable preferences
(Benassy, 1982; Sprumont, 1983). Even though Gibbard (1973) is not convinced about the
positive content of dominant strategy equilibrium, the theoretical literature that followed
endorsed the view that strategy-proofness was providing a bulletproof form of implemen-
tation. Thus, when economics experiments were developed and gained popularity in the
1980s, the dominant strategy hypothesis became the center of attention of the experimental
studies of strategy-proof mechanisms. Until recently the accepted wisdom was that behav-
ior in a game with dominant strategies should be evaluated with respect to the benchmark
of the dominant strategies hypothesis. The common finding in these experimental studies
is a lack of support for this hypothesis (Sec. 6).5
Economic theorists have reacted to the findings in laboratory experiments. The first
attempt was made by Saijo et al. (2007) who looked for scfs that are implementable si-
multaneously in dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium in complete information envi-
ronments. This form of implementation has a robustness property under multiple forms of
incomplete information (Saijo et al., 2007; Adachi, 2014). More recently, Li (2017) identi-
fied a property of some extensive-form dominant strategy mechanisms that simplifies the
problem of identifying a dominant strategy in these games. Experiments support that the
additional requirements of both Saijo et al. (2007) and Li (2017) improve the performance
of mechanisms (Cason et al., 2006; Li, 2017). Sparked by the work of Li (2017), there
has been a growing interest in identifying meaningful differences among dominant strat-
egy mechanisms (Mackenzie, 2019; Pycia and Troyan, 2019), and in identifying alternative
mechanisms that may perform better than direct revelation mechanisms of strategy proof
scfs in experimental environments (Bo and Hakimov, 2019, 2020). Our results advance this
research agenda in two fundamental ways. First, since our aim is exactly to understand
the conditions in which suboptimal equilibria are plausible when a strategy-proof scf is op-
erated, we are better able to rationalize the experimental and empirical evidence against
these scfs. Indeed, this evidence has been collected mainly for mechanisms violating the
additional requirements in these studies, and suboptimal equilibria is not invariably ap-
proximated when these stricter design requirements are not satisfied (see Sec. 6). Second,
with interesting exceptions (e.g., Arribilaga et al., 2019), the requirements identified by
Saijo et al. (2007), Li (2017), and Pycia and Troyan (2019) are only satisfied by priority-like
5In a recently circulated paper, Masuda et al. (2019) present evidence that the rate of truthful reports
in a second-price auction increases when agents are directly advised about the dominance strategy property
of these reports (from 20% to 47% in their experiment).
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scfs in problems of interest that admit more symmetric strategy-proof scfs that satisfy our
robust implementation requirements (c.f. Bochet and Sakai, 2010; Fujinaka and Wakayama,
2011; Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2018; Bade and Gonczarowski, 2017; Troyan, 2019). Thus
our study produces a useful categorization of a considerably larger class of strategy-proof
mechanisms.
Since its inception in private consumption environments by Satterthwaite and Sonnen-
schein (1981), non-bossiness has played a role in social choice literature. Essentially, this
property fills a gap between axioms of individual and collective behavior (e.g., Barbera` et al.,
2016).6 Our work differers from the social choice literature in that the, so to speak, left side
of our characterizations, is a requirement on mechanisms based on a testable property of
behavior, not on a property that one argues in favor of based on its normative content. In
this sense our results are the first to establish a link between a non-bossiness condition and
the empirical content of the Nash equilibrium prediction for the direct revelation mechanism
of a strategy-proof scf.
Strategy-proof mechanisms have been operated for some time in the field. Empirical
studies of such mechanisms have generally corraborated the observations from laboratory
experiments (e.g. Hassidim et al., 2020; Rees-Jones, 2017; Artemov et al., 2020; Chen and
Pereyra, 2019; Shorrer and So´va´go´, 2019), in such high stakes environments as career choice
(Roth, 1984) and school choice (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). Among these papers,
Artemov et al. (2020) and Chen and Pereyra (2019), are the closest to ours. Besides pre-
senting empirical evidence of persistent violations of the dominant strategies hypothesis,
they propose theoretical explanations for it. They restrict to school choice environments
in which a particular mechanism is used. Artemov et al. (2020) study a continuum model
in which the SPDA mechanism is operated in a full-support incomplete information en-
vironment. They conclude that it is reasonable that one can observe equilibria in which
agents make inconsequential mistakes. Their construction is based on the approximation
of the continuum economy by means of finite realizations of it in which agents are allowed
to make mistakes that vanish as the population grows. Chen and Pereyra (2019) study a
finite school choice environment in which there is a unique ranking of students across all
schools. They argue that only when information is not interior an agent can be expected
to deviate from her truthful report based on the analysis of an ordinal form of equilibrium.
6See Thomson (2016) for a survey of the definition and the normative content of the different notions of
non-bossiness that have been used in the social choice literature. The particular form of non-bossiness that
emerges endogenously from our characterization has played a role in at least two previous studies. Bochet
and Tumennassan (2017) find that non-bossiness in welfare-outcome is a necessary and sufficient condition
for a strategy-proof game to have only truthful equivalent equilibria in complete information environments
when truthful behavior is focal. Schummer and Velez (2019) show that non-bossiness in welfare-outcome
is sufficient for a deterministic sequential direct revelation game associated with a strategy-proof scf to
implement the scf itself in sequential equilibria for almost every prior.
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Our study substantially differs in its scope with these two papers, because our results apply
to all private values environments that admit a strategy-proof scf. When applied to a school
choice problem, our results are qualitatively in line with those in these two studies and thus
provide a rational for their empirical findings. However, our results additionally explain the
causes of behavior in these environments (informational assumptions and specific properties
of the mechanisms) and provide exact guidelines of when these phenomena will be present
in any other environment that accepts a strategy-proof mechanism.
Our work can be related with a growing literature on behavioral mechanism design,
which aims to inform the design of mechanisms with regularities observed in laboratory
experiments and empirical data. These papers can be classified in two different approaches.
First, Cabrales and Ponti (2000), Healy (2006), and Tumennasan (2013) study the per-
formance of mechanisms for solutions concepts defined by a convergence process. They
identify properties of mechanisms that guarantee their convergence to desired allocations
under certain dynamics. These conditions turn out to be strong. Indeed, they are violated
by all the strategy-proof mechanisms we have mentioned above. The second approach in
this literature is to analyze the design of mechanisms accounting for behavior that is not
utility maximizing for specific alternative behavior models (c.f., Eliaz, 2002; de Clippel,
2014; de Clippel et al., 2018; Kneeland, 2017). Our work bridges these two approaches. It
informs us about the performance of mechanisms when behavior approximates mutual best
responses by some unrestricted process and at the same time satisfies a weak and testable
form of rationality.
Finally, empirical equilibrium analysis produces policy relevant comparative statics for
mechanisms that do not have dominant strategies. In Velez and Brown (2019a) we apply this
methodolgy to the analysis of partnership dissolution auctions and obtain general results for
the problem of full implementation. In Brown and Velez (2019) we experimentally test the
comparative statics predicted by empirical equilibrium in partnership dissolution auctions.
3 The intuition: empirical plausibility of equilibria of TTC
and second-price auction
Two mechanisms illustrate our main findings. The first is TTC for the reallocation of
indivisible goods from individual endowments (Shapley and Scarf, 1974). The second is the
popular second-price auction. For simplicity, let us consider two-agent stylized versions of
these market design environments.
Suppose that two agents, say {A,B}, are to potentially trade the houses they own
when each agent has strict preferences. TTC is the mechanism that operates as follows.
9
Agent B
H M L
Agent A
H -1/4,0 0,0 1/2,0
M 0,1/2 0,1/4 1/2,0
L 0,1 0,1 1/4,1/2
Table 1: Normal form of second-price auction with complete information when θA = M and θB = H.
Each agent is asked to point to the house that he or she prefers. Then, they trade if
each agent points to the other agent’s house and remain in their houses otherwise. It is
well known that this mechanism is strategy-proof. That is, it is a dominant strategy for
each agent to point to her preferred house. Thus, if one predicts that truthful dominant
strategies will result when this mechanism is operated, one would obtain an efficient trade.
There are more Nash equilibria of the game that ensues when this mechanism is operated.
Consider the strategy profile where each agent unconditionally points to his or her own
house, regardless of information structure. This profile of strategies provides mutual best
responses for expected utility maximizing agents, but does not necessarily produce the same
outcomes as the truthful profile.
The second-price auction is a mechanism for the allocation of a good by a seller among
some buyers. We suppose that there are two buyers {A,B} who may have a type θi ∈
{L,M,H}. The value that an agent assigns to the object depends on her type: vL = 0,
vM = 1/2, and vH = 1. Each agent has quasi-linear preferences, i.e., assigns zero utility to
receiving no object, and vθi −xi to receiving the object and paying xi for it. In the second-
price auction each agent reports his or her value for the object. Then an agent with higher
valuation receives the object and pays the seller the valuation of the other agent. Ties are
decided uniformly at random. It is well known that this mechanism is also strategy-proof.
In its truthful dominant strategy equilibrium it obtains an efficient assignment of the object,
i.e., an agent with higher value receives the object. Moreover, the revenue of the seller is
the second highest valuation. There are more Nash equilibria of the game that ensue when
this mechanism is operated. In order to exhibit such equilibria let us suppose that agent A
has type M , agent B has type H, and both agents have complete information of their types.
Table 1 presents the normal form of the complete information game that ensues. There are
infinitely many Nash equilibria of this game. For instance, agent B reports her true type
and agent A randomizes in some arbitrary way between L and M . In these equilibria, the
seller generically obtains lower revenue than in the truthful equilibrium.
Our quest is then to determine which, if any, of the sub-optimal equilibria of TTC, the
second-price auction, and for that matter any strategy-proof mechanism, should concern a
social planner who operates one of these mechanisms. In order to do so we calculate the
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Figure 1: Weakly payoff monotone profiles (shaded area) and empirical equilibria in TTC game with
complete information when trade is efficient. Agents trade with probability one in the unique empirical
equilibrium: the only Nash equilibrium that is in the closure of weakly payoff monotone behavior.
empirical equilibria of the games induced by the operation of these mechanisms. It turns
out that the Nash equilibria of the TTC and the second-price auction have a very different
nature. No sub-optimal Nash equilibrium of the TTC game is an empirical equilibrium. By
contrast, for some information structures, the second-price auction has empirical equilibria
whose outcomes differ from those of the truthful ones. This is surprising. The sub-optimal
equilibria of the TTC that we exhibit are prior free, i.e., they are strategy profiles that
constitute equilibria independently of the information structure. However, as our analysis
unveils, this property turns out to be unrelated with the empirical plausibility of equilibria.
To build more intuition into the empirical equilibrium refinement, consider first the
TTC game in a complete information environment in which both agents prefer to trade.
In any profile of strategies satisfying weak payoff monotonicity, each agent points to the
other agent with probability at least one half. To see this just suppose the opposite, i.e.,
an agent points to herself with probability greater than one half. Then, this would reveal
that pointing to herself has expected utility greater than pointing to the other agent. Since
pointing to the other agent is a weakly dominant strategy, this cannot happen. From the
two equilibria of this game (both point to each other, or both point to themselves), only each
agent pointing to the other with probability one is a empirical equilibrium. Both agents
pointing to themselves cannot be approached by weakly monotone behavior (Fig. 1). That
is, if behavior can be fit satisfactorily by a model satisfying weak payoff monotonicity, the
only equilibrium that has the chance to be approximated by empirical distributions is the
efficient equilibrium.
Our argument does not depend on the assumption of complete information. Consider
the TTC game when information is summarized by a common prior.7 Since revealing her
true preference is dominant, each agent with each possible type will reveal her preferences
7This can be relaxed to some extent. See Sec. 4.
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with probability at least 1/2 in each weakly payoff monotone profile. Thus, in any limit
of a sequence of weakly payoff monotone strategies, each agent reveals her true preference
with probability at least 1/2. Consequently, in each empirical equilibrium there is a lower
bound on the probability with which each agent is truthful. Given the realization of agents’
types, each agent always believes the true payoff type of the other agent is possible. Then,
in each empirical equilibrium of the TTC, whenever trade is efficient (for the true types of
the agents), each agent will place positive probability on the other agent pointing to her.
Consequently, in each empirical equilibrium of the TTC, given that an agent prefers to
trade, this agent will point to the other agent with probability one whenever efficient trade
is possible. Thus, each empirical equilibrium of the TTC obtains the truthful outcome with
certainty.
For the second-price auction consider the complete information structure whose associ-
ated normal form game is presented in Table 1. Let ε > 0 and σ ≡ (σA, σB) be the pair of
probability distributions on each agent’s action space defined as follows. Agent A places ε
probability on H, 1/2 on M and 1/2−ε on L. Agent B places 1−2ε probability on H, and
ε on each of the other two actions. For small ε this profile is weakly payoff monotone. This
can be easily seen in Fig. 2. Starting at the top left of the figure is σB. This distribution
induces the expected payoffs for agent A shown at the top right of the figure. Since M is the
unique weakly dominant strategy for agent A and σB is interior, the highest payoff for agent
A is achieved by M . Between L and H, agent A obtains a higher payoff with L, because
with H she ends up buying the object for a price above her value with positive probability.
Thus, expected payoffs for agent A are ordered exactly as σA, which is shown at the bottom
right of Fig. 2. If agent A plays σA, agent B’s expected utility is that shown at the bottom
left of Fig. 2. Agent B’s utility is maximized at her unique weakly dominant strategy. Thus,
differences in σB reveal differences in expected utility. More precisely, agent B playing H
with higher probability than both M and L is consistent with H having higher expected
payoff than both M and L. As ε vanishes, this profile converges to a Nash equilibrium in
which agent A randomizes between M and L with equal probability.8
Empirical equilibrium allows us to draw a clear difference between TTC and the second-
price auction. Suppose that agents’ behavior is weakly payoff monotone. Then, if these
mechanisms are operated, one will never observe that empirical distributions of play in
TTC approximate an equilibrium producing a sub-optimal outcome. By contrast, this
possibility is not ruled out for the second-price auction.
8Note that we can easily modify our construction to have interior profiles that are ordinally equivalent
to expected payoffs. This is always possible. That is, each empirical equilibrium of a finite game is the limit
of interior distributions that are, agent-wise, ordinally equivalent to expected payoffs (Velez and Brown,
2019b). Note also that we could easily modify our construction so agent A places probability 1/2 +α on M
and 1/2− α on L for any 0 ≤ α ≤ 1/2.
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Figure 2: Weakly monotone distribution in the second price auction with complete information for agents
M and H. As ε vanishes the distributions converge to a Nash equilibrium in which the lower value agent
randomizes between L and M .
It turns out that these differences among these two mechanisms can be pinned down to a
property that TTC satisfies and the second-price auction violates: non-bossiness in welfare-
outcome, i.e., in the direct revelation game of the mechanism, an agent cannot change the
outcome without changing her welfare (Theorem 1).
For the strategy-proof mechanisms that do violate non-bossiness, it is useful to examine
which information structures produce undesirable empirical equilibria. It turns out that for
a strategy-proof mechanism with essentially unique dominant strategies, like the second-
price auction, this cannot happen for information structures with full support (Theorem 2).
Thus, in a sense, our example above with the second-price auction actually requires the
type of information structure we used.
Together, Theorems 1 and 2 produce sharp predictions about the type of behavior that
is plausible when a strategy-proof scf is operated in different information structures. In
Sec. 6 we review the relevant experimental and empirical literature and find that these
predictions are consistent with it.
4 Model
A group of agents N ≡ {1, . . . , n} is to select an alternative in an arbitrary set X. Agents
have private values, i.e., each i ∈ N has a payoff type θi, determining an expected utility
13
index ui(·|θi) : X → R. The set of possible payoff types for agent i is Θi and the set of
possible payoff type profiles is Θ ≡∏i∈N Θi. We assume that Θ is finite. For each S ⊆ N ,
ΘS is the cartesian product of the type spaces of the agents in S. The generic element of ΘS
is θS . When S = N \ {i} we simply write Θ−i and θ−i. Consistently, whenever convenient,
we concatenate partial profiles, as in (θ−i, µi). We use this notation consistently when
operating with vectors (as in strategy profiles). We assume that information is summarized
by a common prior p ∈ ∆(Θ).9 For each θ in the support of p and each i ∈ N , let p(·|θi)
be the distribution p conditional on agent i drawing type θi.
10
A social choice function (scf) selects a set of alternatives for each possible state. The
generic scf is g : Θ→ X. Three properties of scfs play an important role in our results. An
scf g,
1. is strategy-proof if for each θ ∈ Θ, each i ∈ N , and each τi ∈ Θi, ui(g(θ)|θi) ≥
ui(g(θ−i, τi)|θi).
2. is non-bossy in welfare-outcome if for each θ ∈ Θ, each i ∈ N , and each τi ∈ Θi,
ui(g(θ)|θi) = ui(g(θ−i, τi)|θi) implies that g(θ) = g(θ−i, τi).
3. has essentially unique dominant strategies if for each θ ∈ Θ, each i ∈ N , and each
τi ∈ Θi, if ui(g(θ)|θi) = ui(g(θ−i, τi)|θi) and g(θ) 6= g(θ−i, τi), then there is τ−i ∈ Θ−i
such that ui(g(τ−i, θi)|θi) > ui(g(τ)|θi).
The first property is well-known. The second property requires that no agent, when
telling the truth (in the direct revelation mechanism associated with the scf), be able to
change the outcome by changing her report without changing her welfare. It is satisfied,
among other, by TTC, the Median Voting rule, and the Uniform rule. It is a strengthening
of the non-bossiness condition of Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981), which applies only
to environments with private consumption. Non-bossiness in welfare-outcome is violated by
the Pivotal mechanism, the second-price auction, and SPDA. The third property requires
that any consequential deviation from a truthful report by an agent, can have adverse
consequences for her. Restricted to strategy-proof scfs, this property says that, in the
direct revelation game associated with the scf, for each agent, all dominant strategies are
redundant. This is satisfied whenever true reports are the unique dominant strategies, as
9For a finite set F , ∆(F ) denotes the simplex of probability measures on F .
10Our results can be extended for general type spaces a` la Bergemann and Morris (2005) when one requires
the type of robust implementation in our theorems only for the common support of the priors. We prefer
to present our payoff-type model for two reasons. First, it is much simpler and intuitive. Second, since our
theorems are robust implementation characterizations, they are not stronger results when stated for larger
sets of priors. By stating our theorems in our domain, the reader is sure that we do not make use of the
additional freedoms that games with non-common priors allow.
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in the second-price auction. It is not necessary that dominant strategies be unique for this
property to be satisfied. A student in a school choice environment with strict preferences,
and in which SPDA is operated, may have multiple dominant strategies (think for instance
of a student who is at the top of the ranking of each school). However, any misreport that is
also a dominant strategy for this student, cannot change the outcome (see Online Appendix
for a formal argument).
A mechanism is a pair (M,ϕ) where M ≡ (Mi)i∈N is an unrestricted message space
and ϕ : M → ∆(X) is an outcome function. A finite mechanism is that for which each
Mi is a finite set. Given the common prior p, (M,ϕ) determines a standard Bayesian
game Γ ≡ (M,ϕ, p). When the prior is degenerate, i.e., places probability one in a payoff
type θ ∈ Θ, we refer to this as a game of complete information and denote it simply by
(M,ϕ, θ). A (behavior) strategy for agent i in Γ is a function that assigns to each θi ∈ Θi
that happens with positive probability under p, a function σi(·|θi) ∈ ∆(Mi).11 We denote
a profile of strategies by σ ≡ (σi)i∈N . For each S ⊆ N , and each θS ∈ ΘS , σS(·|θS) is
the corresponding product measure
∏
i∈S σi(·|θi). When S = N we simply write σ(·|θ).
We denote the measure that places probability one on mi ∈ Mi by δmi . With a complete
information structure we simplify notation and do not condition strategies on an agent’s
type, which is uniquely determined by the prior. Thus, in game (M,ϕ, θ) we write σi instead
of σi(·|θi).
Let θi ∈ Θi be realized with positive probability under p. The expected utility of agent i
with type θi, in Γ from playing strategy µi when the other agents select actions as prescribed
by σ−i is
Uϕ(σ−i, µi|p, θi) ≡
∑
u(ϕ(m)|θi)p(θ−i|θi)σ−i(m−i|θ−i)µi(mi|θi),
where the summation is over all θ−i ∈ θ−i and m ∈ M . A profile of strategies σ is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ if for each θ ∈ Θ in the support of p, each i ∈ N , and each
µi ∈ ∆(Mi), Uϕ(σ−i, µi|p, θi) ≤ Uϕ(σ−i, σi|p, θi). The set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of Γ
is N(Γ). We say that mi ∈Mi is a weakly dominant action for agent i with type θi ∈ Θi in
(M,ϕ) if for each ri ∈Mi, and each m−i ∈M−i, ui(m|θi) ≥ ui(m−i, ri|θi).
Our main basis for empirical plausibility of behavior is the following weak form of
rationality.
Definition 1. A profile of strategies for Γ ≡ (M,ϕ, p), σ ≡ (σi)i∈N , is weakly payoff
monotone for Γ if for each θ ∈ Θ in the support of p, each i ∈ N , and each pair {mi, ni} ⊆Mi
such that σi(mi|θi) > σi(ni|θi), Uϕ(σ−i, δmi |p, θi) > Uϕ(σ−i, δni |p, θi).
11All of our results refer to finite mechanisms. Thus, we avoid any formalism to account for strategies on
infinite sets.
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We then identify the Nash equilibria that can be approximated by empirically plausible
behavior.
Definition 2. An empirical equilibrium of Γ ≡ (M,ϕ, p) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
Γ that is the limit of a sequence of weakly payoff monotone distributions for Γ.
In any finite game, proper equilibria (Myerson, 1978), firm equilibria and approachable
equilibria (van Damme, 1991), and the limiting logistic equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995) are empirical equilibria. Thus, existence of empirical equilibrium holds for each finite
game.
5 Results
We start with a key lemma stating that, when available, weakly dominant actions will
always be part of the support of each empirical equilibrium in a game.
Lemma 1. Let (M,ϕ) be a mechanism and p a common prior. Let i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi.
Suppose that mi ∈Mi is a weakly dominant action for agent i with type θi in (M,ϕ). Let
σ be an empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, p). Then, mi is in the support of σi(·|θi).
The following theorem characterizes the strategy-proof scfs for which the empirical equi-
libria of its revelation game produce with certainty, for each common prior information
structure, the truthful outcome.
Theorem 1. Let g be an scf. The following statements are equivalent.
1. For each common prior p and each empirical equilibrium of (Θ, g, p), say σ, we have
that for each pair {θ, τ} ⊆ Θ where θ is in the support of p and τ is in the support of
σ(·|θ), g(θ) = g(τ).
2. g is strategy-proof and non-bossy in welfare-outcome.
We now discuss the proof of Theorem 1. Let us discuss first why a strategy-proof
and non-bossy in welfare-outcome scf g has the robustness property in statement 1 in the
theorem. Suppose that σ ∈ N(Θ, g, p), that the true type of the agents is θ, and that the
agents end up reporting τ with positive probability under σ. Consider an arbitrary agent,
say i. Since g is strategy-proof, τi can be a best response for agent i with type θi only if
it gives the agent the same utility as reporting θi for each report of the other agents that
agent i believes will be observed with positive probability. Thus, since there are rational
expectations in a common prior game, report τi needs to give agent i the same utility as θi
when the other agents report τ−i. Since g is non-bossy in welfare-outcome, it has to be the
16
case that g(τ−i, θi) = g(τ). By Lemma 1, if σ is an empirical equilibrium of (Θ, g, p), agent i
reports her true type with positive probability in σ. Thus, (τ−i, θi) is played with positive
probability in σ. Thus, we can iterate over the set of agents and conclude that g(θ) = g(τ).
Let us discuss now the proof of the converse statement. First, we observe that it is
well-known that the type of robust implementation in statement 1 of the theorem implies
the scf is strategy-proof (Dasgupta et al., 1979; Bergemann and Morris, 2005). Thus, it
is enough to prove that if g is strategy-proof and satisfies the robustness property, it has
to be non-bossy in welfare-outcome. Our proof of this statement is by contradiction. We
suppose to the contrary that for some type θ, an agent, say i, can change the outcome
of g by reporting some alternative τi without changing her welfare. We then show that
the complete information game (Θ, g, θ) has an empirical equilibrium in which (θ−i, τi) is
observed with positive probability. The subtlety of doing this resides in that our statement
is free of details about the payoff environment in which it applies. We have an arbitrary
number of agents and we know little about the structure of agents’ preferences. If we
had additional information about the environment, as say for the second-price auction, the
construction could be greatly simplified as in our illustrating example.
To solve this problem we design an operator that responds to four different types of
signals, κε,r,η,λ : ∆(Θ1) × · · · × ∆(Θn) → ∆(Θ1) × · · · × ∆(Θn), where {r, λ} ⊆ N and
{ε, η} ⊆ (0, 1). This operator has fixed points that are always weakly payoff monotone
distributions for u. For a given ε, the operator restricts its search of distributions to those
that place at least probability ε in each action for agent i. For a given η, the operator
restricts its search of distributions to those that place at least probability η in each action for
each agent j 6= i. If we take r to infinity, the operator looks for distributions in which agent
i’s frequency of play is almost a best response to the other agents’ distribution (constrained
by ε). If we take λ to infinity, the operator looks for distributions in which for each agent
j 6= i, her frequency of play is almost a best response to the other agents’ distribution
(constrained by η). The proof is completed by proving that for the right sequence of
signals, the operator will have fixed points that in the limit exhibit the required properties.
To simplify our discussion without losing the core of the argument, let us suppose that each
agent j 6= i has a unique weakly dominant action for each type. Fix ε and r. Since we base
the construction of our operator on continuous functions, one can prove that there is δ > 0
such that for each fixed point of the operator, if the expected utility of reports θi and τi
does not differ in more than δ, then agent i places probability almost the same on these two
reports. Let η > 0. If each agent j 6= i approximately places probability η in each action
that is not weakly dominant and the rest in her dominant action, the utility of agent i from
reports θi and τi will be almost the same when η is small. Thus, one can calibrate η for
this difference to be less than δ > 0. Let η(ε, r, δ) be this value. If we take λ to infinity
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keeping ε, r, η(ε, r, δ) constant, the distribution of each agent j 6= i in each fixed point of the
operator will place, approximately, probability η(ε, r, δ) in each action that is not weakly
dominant. Thus, for large λ, κε,r,η(ε,r,δ),λ has a fixed point in which agent i is playing θi
and τi with almost the same probability and all other agents are playing their dominant
strategy with almost certainty. We grab one of this distributions. It is the first point in
our sequence, which we construct by repeating this argument starting from smaller εs and
δs and larger rs.
Interestingly, the conclusions of Theorem 1 depend on our requirement that the empirical
equilibria of the scf generate only truthful outcomes for type spaces in which an agent may
know, with certainty, the payoff type of the other agents.
Theorem 2. Let g be an scf. The following statements are equivalent.
1. For each full-support prior p and each empirical equilibrium of (Θ, g, p), say σ, we
have that for each pair {θ, τ} ∈ Θ where τ is in the support of σ(·|θ), g(θ) = g(τ).
2. g is strategy-proof and has essentially unique dominant strategies.
Lemma 1 and Theorems 1 and 2 give us a clear description of the weakly payoff monotone
behavior that can be observed when a strategy-proof scf is operated. In the next section
we contrast these predictions with experimental evidence on strategy-proof mechanisms.
6 Experimental and empirical evidence
6.1 Dominant strategy play
The performance of strategy-proof mechanisms in an experimental environment has at-
tracted a fair amount of attention. Essentially, experiments have been run to test the
hypothesis that dominant strategy equilibrium is a reasonable prediction for these games.
The common finding is a lack of support for this hypothesis in most simultaneous move
dominant strategy mechanisms.12
Our results provide an alternative theoretical framework from which one can reevaluate
these experimental results. Theorems 1 and 2 state that as long as empirical distributions
of play are weakly payoff monotone we should expect two features in data. First, we will
never see agents’ behavior approximate a Nash equilibrium that is not truthful equivalent
in two situations: (i) the scf is strategy-proof and non-bossy in welfare-outcome; or (ii) each
agent believes all other payoff types are possible and the scf has essentially unique dominant
12The only exceptions appear to be extensive form dominant strategy mechanisms satisfying further sim-
plicity conditions (Li, 2017).
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strategies. Second, one cannot rule out that sub-optimal equilibria are approximated by
weakly payoff monotone behavior when the scf violates non-bossiness in welfare-outcome
and information is complete.
It is informative to note that our first conclusion still holds if we only require, instead
of weak payoff monotonicity, that there is a lower bound on the probability with which an
agent reports truthfully, an easier hypothesis to test. Thus, in order to investigate whether
a sub-optimal Nash equilibrium is approximated in situations (i) and (ii), it is enough
to verify that truthful play is non-negligible and does not dissipate in experiments with
multiple rounds. This is largely supported by data.
In Table 2, we survey the literature for experimental results with dominant strategy
mechanisms. We find ten studies across a variety of mechanisms. In all of these studies we
are able to determine, based on the number of pure strategies available to each player, how
often a dominant strategy would be played if subjects uniformly played all pure strategies.13
In every experiment, rates of dominant strategy play exceed this threshold.14 A simple
binomial test—treating each of these nine papers as a single observation—rejects any null
hypothesis that these rates of dominant strategy play are drawn from a random distribution
with median probability at or below these levels (p < 0.001). Thus one would reasonably
conclude that rates of dominant strategy play should exceed that under uniform support.15
It is evident then that the accumulated experimental data supports the conclusion that
under conditions (i) and (ii) agents’ behavior is not likely to settle on a sub-optimal equilib-
rium. As long as agents are not choosing a best response, the behavior of the other agents
will continue flagging their consequential deviations from truthful behavior as considerably
inferior.16
6.2 Observing empirical equilibria
Among the experiments we surveyed, Cason et al. (2006), Healy (2006), and Andreoni et al.
(2007) involve the operation of a strategy-proof mechanism that violates non-bossiness in
13Healy (2006) does not explicitly bound reports. We take as basis the range of submitted reports.
14These results are not different if one looks only at initial or late play in the experiments.
15Our benchmark of uniform bids is well defined in each finite environment. Thus it allows for a meaningful
aggregation of the different studies. For the second-price auction, an alternative comparison is the rate of
dominant strategy play in this mechanism and the frequency of bids that are equal to the agent’s own value
in the first-price auction. Among the experiments we survey, Andreoni et al. (2007) allows for this direct
comparison in experimental sessions that differ only on the price rule. In this experiment, dominant strategy
play in the second-price auction is 68.25%, 57.50%, 51.25%; and in the first-price auction the percentage of
agents bidding their value is 6.17%, 11.92%, 19.48% for three corresponding information structures. Because
there are only two sessions each under the two auction mechanisms, non-parametric tests cannot show these
differences to be significant at the session level (p = 1/3). They are significantly different at the subject
level for a variety of non-parametric and parametric tests (p < 0.001).
16Recall that our prediction is that under conditions (i) and (ii), behavior will not settle in a suboptimal
equilibrium, not that behavior will necessarily converge to a truthful equilibrium.
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welfare-outcome in an information environment in which information is not interior. These
experiments offer us the chance to observe Nash equilibria attaining outcomes different from
the truthful one with positive probability.
In Cason et al. (2006), two-agent groups (row and column) play eight to ten rounds
in randomly rematched groups with the same pivotal mechanism payoff matrix over all
rounds.17 This experiment was designed to test “secure implementation” (Saijo et al., 2007).
This theory obtains a characterization of scfs whose direct revelation game implements
the scf itself both in dominant strategies and Nash equilibria for all complete information
priors. By running experiments with the pivotal mechanism, which violates the secure
implementation requirements, the authors illustrated that this may be compatible with
the observation of equilibria that are not truthful equivalent. Indeed, these authors argue
that even though deviations from dominant strategy play are arguably persistent in their
pivotal mechanism experiment, virtually all subjects are playing mutual best responses to
the population of subjects by the end of the experiment (c.f., Figure 7, Cason et al., 2006).18
In Healy (2006), five-agent groups with fixed utility functions play fifty rounds in a
mechanism that belongs to the VCG family to choose the level of provision of a public good.
Agents have quasi-linear preferences and their utility for the public good is determined by
two parameters.19 Since it is central to his analysis, the author directly addresses the issue
and concludes that “weakly dominated ε-Nash equilibria are observed, while the dominant
strategy equilibrium is not” (Result 4 Healy, 2006).
In Andreoni et al. (2007), groups of four agents sequentially play three simultaneous
games in each round for thirty rounds. Groups are rematched each round and play an
auction game with the same values but increasing precision of information about the other
players. The first game involves no information about the other players’ valuations beyond
the distribution from which they are drawn. The final game involves complete information.
These authors run separate sessions with the first-price auction and the second-price auction.
Andreoni et al. (2007)’s main objective is to experimentally evaluate the effect of infor-
mation structure on the first-price and second-price auctions. Their theoretical benchmark
is the information-driven comparative statics developed by Kim and Che (2004) for the
first-price auction, and the dominant strategy hypothesis, which implies there is no role
17Agents are informed of their payoffs, but not of the payoff of the other agent. Each agent knows that
the payoff of the other agent does not change across rounds, however. Thus, it is plausible that agents form
beliefs about their opponents play that are not interior. Indeed, after some rounds, each agent has a small
sample of the distribution of play of the other agent’s fixed payoff type.
18Secure implementation is achieved by strategy-proof scfs that are non-bossy in welfare-outcome and
satisfy a rectangularity condition we state in Theorem 3. See our analysis of secure implementation in the
context of robust implementation in Sec. 7 for details.
19Again as in Cason et al. (2006), agents’ types are fixed, but agents are not provided with the information
of the payoff matrix of the other agents.
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Figure 3: Group outcomes in 4-person, second-price auctions in Andreoni et al. (2007) under full-support
incomplete (left) and complete (right) information. The dark gray area indicates the proportion of outcomes
where all subjects play mutual best responses to the actions of all other group members. The light gray area
indicates outcomes where the transaction associated with the dominant strategy outcome occurs, that is, the
subject with the highest valuation obtains the item and pays the amount of the second highest valuation.
The medium gray area indicates the percentage of group outcomes where all subjects play a dominant
strategy. Note that each level necessarily contains the subsequent level. Subjects are rematched randomly
across a group of 20 each period.
of information structure, for the second-price auction. Thus, these authors designed and
carried out an ideal experiment to evaluate the operation of a bossy strategy-proof scf that
has unique dominant strategies, the second-price auction, in both full-support and com-
plete information environments. In contrast to the dominant strategy hypothesis, empirical
equilibrium analysis has sharp predictions for such a mechanism in these environments.
One can argue that frequencies of play in all treatments in Andreoni et al. (2007)’s ex-
periment accumulate towards a Nash equilibrium. Fig. 3 shows the proportion of outcomes
where all subjects in a group play best-responses (dark gray), where the subject with the
highest valuation obtains it at the second highest valuation (light gray), and all subjects
play dominant strategies (medium gray) under full-support incomplete information (left)
and complete information (right).20 In both cases, virtually all subjects are playing mutual
best responses to the population of subjects in the second half of the experiment. Note that
frequencies of best response play plotted in Fig. 3 are the percentage of groups in which
all four agents end up playing a best response to each other. Even when this percentage is
80%, individual rates of best response play is about 95%.
Empirical equilibrium analysis reveals that behavior that is weakly payoff monotone and
approximates mutual best responses in this experiment will necessarily have certain charac-
teristics. For the second-price auction if information is interior, as in the first information
20We concentrate our analysis on the extreme information structures in Andreoni et al. (2007) design for
which Theorems 1 and 2 produce sharp predictions.
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treatment, this type of behavior can only approximate a truthful equivalent Nash equilib-
rium. If information is complete, as in the last information treatment, this type of behavior
can accumulate towards a Nash equilibrium in which the lower value agents randomize with
positive probability. Both phenomena are supported by the data.
Fig. 4 allows us to understand behavior in both information structures. The figure
standardizes bids to valuations (the highest valuation is assigned a value of 4, the second
highest a value of 3, and so on) and shows the median bid and the range that contains
the higher and lower 85% of bids for bids by each of the four ranked valuation types. In
both treatments the median bid for any of the four types generally falls on its respective
valuation, consistent with dominant strategy play.
In the full-support incomplete information treatment, agents’ deviations from their dom-
inant strategies do not induce consequential deviations from the truthful equilibrium. After
the initial five rounds, median bids are the agents’ own values (Fig. 4 (left)). In the last
twenty five rounds, 74.4% outcomes are truthful (Fig. 3 (left)); 97.2% outcomes are efficient,
i.e., such that a highest valuation agent wins the auction (Fig. 5 (left)); in 94.4% of outcomes
the price is determined by the bid of a second valuation agent; and on average the price paid
by the winner differs in 1.188 points (average of the absolute value of differences) from the
second highest valuation (Fig. 5 (right)). Thus, the mechanism is arguably achieving the
social planner’s objectives. It is virtually assigning the good to a highest valuation agent
and it is essentially raising revenue equal to the second highest valuation.
In the complete information treatment, after five rounds median bids are also the agents’
own values (Fig. 4 (right)). Differently from the incomplete information case, deviations
from truthful behavior do not dissipate and are consequential. In the last twenty five rounds,
38.4% outcomes are truthful (Fig. 3 (right)); 91.6% outcomes are efficient, i.e., such that a
highest valuation agent wins the auction (Fig. 5 (left)); in 68.4% of outcomes the price is
determined by the bid of a second valuation agent; and on average the price paid by the
winner differs in 8.704 points from the second highest valuation (Fig. 5 (right)).21 Thus,
even though the mechanism is assigning the good to the right agent, it is raising a revenue
that is persistently away from the social planner’s objective.
A simple reason explains the differences in behavior between treatments. Under incom-
plete information there is a penalty for a player to deviate too much from his/her dominant
strategy. There is no corresponding penalty under complete information. As long as a
lower valuation player does not outbid the first, the payoff of the lower valuation agent will
21Andreoni et al. (2007) only report two sessions under the second price auction. Each features a within-
session comparison of these two information structures. Because there are only two paired comparisons
at the session level, non-parametric tests cannot show these differences to be significant (p = 0.5). At the
subject level, they are significantly different for a variety of non-parametric and parametric tests (p < 0.001).
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Figure 4: Median bid and 15th-85th percentile range by valuation type in 4-person, second-price auctions
of Andreoni et al. (2007) under incomplete (left) and complete (right) information. Bids are standardized
so that the valuation of the 1st-4th valuations in the specific auction are assigned values 4–1, respectively.
Bids of 100 (the highest possible valuation) and 200 (the highest possible bid) are assigned values of 5 and
6, respectively. If two valuation types have the same value, valuation order is randomly assigned. Bids
between two valuations are standardized by (bid − valuationj)/(valuationi − valuationj) where i is the
highest valuation a bid exceeds and j is the next highest valuation. Bids below the lowest valuation are
standardized on the interval between 0 and the lowest valuation. Bids above the highest valuation are
standardized either on the interval between the highest valuation and 100 (values of 4–5), or 100 and 200
(values of 5–6). For example, for the four valuations 80, 40, 25, 10, bids of 150, 40, 30, and 5 would be 5.5,
3, 2.33, and 0.5, respectively.
be zero regardless. Together these experiments reveal that agents do react to pecuniary
incentives and use information and observed frequencies of play of the other agents in a
meaningful way. They do not preemptively react to a hypothetical tremble of the other
agents, however. In the complete information case the highest valuation agent persistently
overbids and the other agents persistently bid on a wide range under the highest valuation
agent’s value. As long as these behaviors are essentially separated, they are mutual best
responses. On the other hand, in the incomplete information treatment, for each bid, there
is a positive probability that at least an agent draws that bid as valuation. Since agents bid
their values with high probability (68.2% on average), there is a non-trivial chance that a
significant deviation from truthful behavior is suboptimal. Thus, agents take into account
a potential loss in utility, but only when there is an actual significant probability of it being
realized.22
22Since the first experiments on the second-price auctions with private values of Coppinger et al. (1980)
and Kagel and Levin (1993), experimental economists have observed that even though agents do not play
their dominant strategy in these games, the probability with which they would have ended up disciplined by
the market given what the other are doing is very low. Our analysis goes beyond this observation by showing
that as predicted by empirical equilibrium analysis, the degree to which these deviations are consequential
is linked to the non-bossiness properties of the scf and the information structure.
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Figure 5: Frequency of efficient outcomes (left) and average distance (conditional on efficient outcome)
between the price and a second valuation (right) in the second-price auction experiments of Andreoni et al.
(2007) in the full-support incomplete and complete information treatments.
6.3 Payoff monotonicity
One of the advantages of empirical equilibrium analysis is that it is based on an observable
property of behavior. That is, the conclusions of our theorems will hold whenever empirical
distributions are weakly payoff monotone. Thus, evaluating the extent to which agents
frequencies of play satisfy this property allows us to understand better the positive content
of our theory.
Evaluating weak payoff monotonicity is an elusive task, however. In realistic games as
those in the experiments we surveyed, action spaces and type spaces are large (e.g., Attiyeh
et al., 2000 has 2001 actions). This makes the data requirements for fully testing payoff
monotonicity unrealistic. It is plausible that data can point to differences on frequencies
of play between two given actions for a certain agent type. In order to test that this
is consistent with weak payoff monotonicity one would need to verify that the expected
payoffs of these actions given what the other agents are doing are ranked in accordance to
the frequencies of play of these actions. Doing so requires, in most cases, that one has a
good estimate of the whole distribution of play for all agent types.
Even though fully testing weak payoff monotonicity is not feasible with realistic data
sets, one can test for certain markers of this property that are less demanding on data.
First, in weakly payoff monotone data sets there should be a positive association between
the frequencies with which actions are played and their empirical expected utility. For the
four studies where we have sufficient data (Andreoni et al., 2007; Attiyeh et al., 2000; Cason
et al., 2006; Li, 2017), we can compare the actual payoffs earned with each action choice
with the counterfactual payoffs had a subject chosen a different action. If subjects choose
actions independent of payoffs—a gross violation of weak monotonicity—we should suspect
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the differences between the average payoffs of played strategies and counterfactual payoffs of
non-played strategies to be evenly distributed around zero. Instead we find in all cases the
average payoffs of played strategies exceed those of non-played strategies.23 Treating the 30
total sessions across these four studies as independent observations, we can easily reject the
null hypothesis that strategies are played independent of expected payoffs (p < 0.001).24
Not all features of data are in line with weak payoff monotonicity, however. We are
aware of three of these. First, in the Pivotal mechanism experiment of Cason et al. (2006),
there are two dominant strategies for each agent. While the Column agent chooses them
with similar frequencies (36.1% and 38.3%), the Row agent chooses them with frequencies
51.1% and 19.4%. Parametric paired t-tests and non-parametric signed rank and sign tests
suggest the later difference is statistically significant at the subject level (p < 0.01), but not
the former. Second, there is a well documented propensity of overbidding in second-price
auctions. This does not have to be necessarily at odds with weak payoff monotonicity.
Agents who draw larger values will find overbidding with respect to value to be a less costly
mistake than underbidding. Low value agents will have fewer bids below their value than
above their value. Thus, such an agent’s distribution of play can still be weakly payoff
monotone and in aggregate overbid more than underbid. However, Figure 1 in Andreoni
et al. (2007), which depicts the frequency of the difference between the bid of the low value
agents and the maximal value, shows that these agents place significantly higher weight in
the bids that are close to the maximal value agent. This is a clear violation of weak payoff
monotonicity, which as Andreoni et al. (2007) argue, may have origin in spiteful behavior
of the low value agents.25 Finally, a simple behavioral regularity as rounding to multiples
of five, can easily induce violations of weak payoff monotonicity (such patterns are present
in the auction data of Andreoni et al., 2007; Brown and Velez, 2019; Li, 2017, for instance).
In order to evaluate the positive content of empirical equilibrium analysis, it is necessary
to understand the consequences for our analysis of these and other possible violations of
23Using a conditional-logistic regression also produces positive coefficients in all cases. It also assumes a
specific formalized structure on subject choice, making it a less general test.
24Specifically, in 30 out of 30 sessions the average strategy subjects played in a round had higher expected
payoffs than those they didn’t play. If we exclude all instances where subjects played a dominant strategy,
this result holds in 28 out of 30 sessions.
25There is a commonly accepted folk wisdom within experimental economics literature that supports the
idea that private rather than common information of values may be beneficial for market outcomes (see
Smith, 1994). The general justification is that when more information is available about others’ valuations,
individuals may strive to deviate from the single-shot Nash equilibrium in order to capture more economic
rents. Our theory does not require nor utilize this type of behavior to justify the differences in predicted
plausible equilibria between incomplete and complete information. In this particular instance, the “spiteful
behavior” noted in the complete information treatment of Andreoni et al. (2007) is not present in the full-
support incomplete information treatment, which makes it difficult to reconcile with any model of other
regarding preferences. Thus, at least in this game, other regarding preferences play a role only when
individual incentives for truthful revelation are negligible.
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weak payoff monotonicity. One avenue is to reconsider our construction and restart from
a more basic principle than weak payoff monotonicity. Observe that this property can be
stated in its contrapositive form as follows: If between two actions, say a and b, an agent’s
expected utility of a given what the other are doing is greater than or equal to that of b,
then the frequency with which the agent plays a should be no less than the frequency with
which the agent plays b. Stated in this form this property can be naturally weakened as
follows. One can require the existence of some constant α ∈ (0, 1) such that for any two
actions available to an agent, say a and b, if the expected utility of a given what the other
are doing is greater than or equal than that of b, then the frequency with which the agent
plays a should be no less than α times the frequency with which the agent plays b. One can
determine that all our results follow through if we take as basis for plausibility this weaker
property. It is interesting in itself to see that such a weak property still provides empirical
restrictions on data. Moreover, the main message of empirical equilibrium analysis in other
applications, like full implementation, is also preserved under this generalization (Velez and
Brown, 2019b).
We prefer to maintain the analysis based on weak payoff monotonicity because it strikes
a balance between the regularity it provides while being challenged only by phenomena that
(i) do not seem universally relevant, and (ii) seem to induce only continuous violations of
this principle. Agents may round their bids, may be attracted by labels attached to certain
actions, may exhibit other regarding preferences in certain contexts, and so on. At the
end, what matters for empirical equilibrium analysis is that these features of behavior will
be part of a bigger scheme in which agents are to a significant extent trying to hit their
best payoffs given what the other agents are doing. By analyzing what happens when these
less well understood effects are absent, we obtain a powerful benchmark producing policy
relevant comparative statics.
Finally, an emerging empirical literature concerning strategy-proof mechanisms presents
evidence in line with the predictions of empirical equilibrium. In empirical data, in which
payoff types are not observable, it is of course challenging to determine what a deviation
from truthful behavior is. However, in some instances the researcher is able to identify
dominated actions, as an agent refusing to apply for financial support when this does not
influence her acceptance to an academic position (Hassidim et al., 2020) or by means of
ex-post surveys (Rees-Jones, 2017). The common finding is that these types of reports are
observed with positive probability. However, in line with our results, they are more common
among the agents for whom they are less likely to be consequential (Hassidim et al., 2020;
Rees-Jones, 2017; Artemov et al., 2020; Chen and Pereyra, 2019; Shorrer and So´va´go´, 2019).
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7 Robust mechanism design and revelation principle
One can draw an informative parallel between our results and the robust full implementation
of scfs (Bergemann and Morris, 2005). This literature articulates the idea that the designer
should look for mechanisms that operate well independently of informational assumptions.
Of course one’s judgement about this depends on the prediction that one uses. Here are
the news if one considers the Nash equilibrium prediction.26
Theorem 3. Let g be an scf. The following are equivalent.
1. There is a finite mechanism (M,ϕ) such that for each possible common prior p, each
Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ of (M,ϕ, p), each possible θ ∈ Θ in the support of p,
and each message m in the support of σ(·|θ), ϕ(m) = g(θ).
2. (i) g is strategy-proof and non-bossy in welfare-outcome, and (ii) g satisfies the out-
come rectangular property, i.e., for each pair of payoff types {θ, τ} ⊆ Θ, if for each
i ∈ N , g(θi, τ−i) = g(τ), then g(θ) = g(τ).
A parallel result to Theorem 3 is due to Saijo et al. (2007) (1 ⇒ 2) and Adachi (2014)
(2 ⇒ 1) in an environment in which they restrict to pure-strategy equilibria and they
consider implementation for type spaces larger than our payoff-type space. Our statement
includes mixed-strategy equilibria and does not make any requirement for type spaces in
which payoff types can be “cloned.” Thus, Saijo et al. (2007) and Adachi (2014)’s results
do not trivially imply Theorem 3 by means of Bergemann and Morris (Sec. 6.3, 2011)’s
purification argument. The proof of Theorem 3 can be completed by adapting the arguments
in these papers, however. We include it in an online Appendix.
Theorem 3 allows us to make a precise comparison of Theorems 1 and 2 with the lit-
erature on robust implementation. As mentioned in the introduction, the conditions in
Theorem 3 are restrictive (c.f. Saijo et al., 2007; Bochet and Sakai, 2010; Fujinaka and
Wakayama, 2011). The outcome rectangular property is responsible for large part of these
restrictions (Table 3). Thus, the aim of designing mechanisms that produce only the desired
outcomes, in all Nash equilibria for all information structures, may be unnecessarily pes-
simistic. None of the mechanisms in Table 3 pass the test. However, if one already believes
that a Nash equilibrium will be a good prediction when the mechanism is operated, it is
26One can even go further and require this type of robustness for all realizations of agents’ types for type
spaces with no rational expectations a la Bergemann and Morris (2005). In a private values model without
imposing common prior discipline, very little can be done (Bergemann and Morris, 2011; Adachi, 2014). On
the other hand, if one aims at obtaining the right outcomes at least when agents consider themselves mutually
possible, which covers each possible realization in each common prior payoff-type space, the mechanisms
characterized in Theorem 3 still do the job (Adachi, 2014).
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scf
Strategy
proofness
Essentially
unique
dominant
strategies
Non-
bossiness
in welfare-
outcome
outcome
rectan-
gular
property
TTC + + + −
Uniform rule + + + −
Median voting + + + −
Second price auction + + − −
Pivotal + + − −
SPDA + + − −
Table 3: Strategy-proof scfs and the outcome rectangular property; + indicates that the property labeling
the column is satisfied by the scf, and − the opposite. These statements refer to the usual preference spaces
in which these scfs are defined.
enough to be concerned only with the Nash equilibria that is plausible will be observed.
By Theorem 1, TTC, Uniform rule, and median voting pass the more realistic test for all
common prior type spaces. By Theorem 2, the second-price auction, Pivotal mechanism,
and SPDA pass the test for all full-support common prior type spaces.
It is worth noting that statement 1 in Theorem 3 is quantified over all finite mechanisms,
while statement 1 in Theorem 1 only refers to the direct revelation game of the scf. It turns
out that whenever statement 1 in Theorem 3 is satisfied by some mechanism for an scf, it is
also satisfied by the scf’s direct revelation mechanism (Saijo et al., 2007). This means that
a “revelation principle” holds for this type of implementation.
It is not clear that a revelation principle holds when empirical equilibrium is one’s
prediction in these games. That is, we do not know whether there is a strategy-proof scf
that violates non-bossiness in welfare-outcome for which there is a mechanism that has the
properties in statement 1 of Theorem 1. The issue is very interesting and subtle.
It is known that the restriction to direct revelation mechanisms is not without loss of
generality for full implementation. That is, dominant strategy full implementation may
require richer message spaces than the payoff-type spaces (Dasgupta et al., 1979; Repullo,
1985). Strikingly, Repullo (1985) constructs a finite social choice environment that admits
a strategy-proof social choice function whose direct revelation game for certain type has a
dominant strategy equilibrium that Pareto dominates the outcome selected by the scf for
that type. Moreover, the social choice environment in this example also admits a mechanism
that implements in dominant strategies the social choice function.
By Lemma 1 we know that a dominant strategy profile in a game will always be ob-
served with positive probability in each empirical equilibrium of the game.27 Thus, Repullo
(1985)’s concern that undesirable outcomes —in this case dominant strategy equilibrium
27Observe also that by Theorem 1, Repullo (1985)’s scf necessarily violates non-bossiness in welfare-
outcome.
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outcomes— of a direct revelation game for a strategy-proof scf may be empirically plausible,
is well founded. As Repullo (1985) proves, it is possible to enlarge the message spaces and
tighten the incentives for the selection of a particular outcome in a way that the desired
outcome is the only dominant strategy outcome. It turns out that this type of message space
enlargement, i.e., those that retain the existence of dominant strategies, will not resolve the
issue for empirical equilibrium implementation.
Theorem 4 (Revelation principle for dominant strategy finite mechanisms). Let g be an
scf. The following are equivalent.
1. There is a finite mechanism (M,ϕ) for which each agent type has at least a weakly
dominant action, and such that for each possible common prior p, each empirical
equilibrium σ of (M,ϕ, p), each possible type θ ∈ Θ in the support of p, and each
message m in the support of σ(·|θ), ϕ(m) = g(θ).
2. For each common prior p and each empirical equilibrium of (Θ, g, p), say σ, we have
that for each pair {θ, τ} ⊆ Θ where θ is in the support of p and τ is in the support of
σ(·|θ), g(θ) = g(τ).
3. g is strategy-proof and non-bossy in welfare-outcome.
Theorem 4 implies that it is impossible to obtain robust implementation in empirical
equilibrium of a social choice function that violates non-bossiness in welfare-outcome by a
dominant strategies mechanism. It is worth noting that enlarging the message space on
the direct revelation game of a strategy-proof scf that violates non-bossiness in welfare-
outcome may have a meaningful effect on the performance of the mechanism, even when
one preserves the existence of dominant strategies.
Example 1. Consider an environment with two agents N ≡ {1, 2} whose payoff-type
spaces are Θ1 ≡ {θ1} and Θ2 ≡ {θ2, θ′2}. There are two possible outcomes {a, b}; and
u1(a|θ1) > u1(b|θ1), u2(a|θ2) = u1(b|θ2), and u2(a|θ′2) < u2(b|θ′2). Suppose that a social
planner desires to implement the efficient dictatorship in which agent 2 gets her top choice.
One can easily see that for any common prior p, for each empirical equilibrium of (Θ, g, p),
say σ, agent 2 with payoff type θ2 uniformly randomizes in Θ2. Thus, in each empirical
equilibrium of (Θ, g, p), agent 2 always achieves her top choice and agent 1 receives her
top choice with 1/2 probability when this does not conflict with agent 2’s preferences.
Suppose now that the social planner uses mechanism (M,ϕ) defined as follows: M1 ≡ {θ1},
M2 ≡ {θ′2,m12, ....,mk2} where k ∈ N, ϕ(θ1, θ′2) = b, and for each l = 1, ..., k, ϕ(θ1,ml2) = a.
One can see easily that in each empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, p), agent 2 always achieves
her top choice and agent 1 receives her top choice with k/(k+1) probability when this does
not conflict with agent 2’s preferences.
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Finally, it is well known that the restriction to social choice functions is not without
loss of generality in robust implementation. Indeed, Bergemann and Morris (2005, Example
2) show that “partial” robust implementation can be achieved for a “social choice corre-
spondence” that does not posses any strategy-proof single-valued selection. Their argument
can be adapted to account for mixed strategies, which are essential in our analysis, and to
show that the same phenomenon happens in our environment (see Example 2 in our Online
Appendix).
8 Conclusion
We have presented theoretical and empirical evidence that strategy-proof scfs are not all
the same with respect to how plausible it is that behavior in the direct revelation game
associated with the scf can approximate a suboptimal equilibrium. Our analysis is based
on empirical equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium that we introduce. It selects
all the Nash equilibria that are not rejected as implausible by some model that is disci-
plined by weak payoff monotonicity. We draw two main conclusions under the hypothesis
that observable behavior satisfies this property. First, behavior from the operation of a
strategy-proof and non-bossy in welfare-outcome scf will never approximate a sub-optimal
Nash equilibrium. Second, if the mechanism violates the non-bossiness condition but has
essentially unique dominant strategies, then behavior can approximate a sub-optimal equi-
librium only if information is not interior. These predictions are supported by experimental
data on multiple mechanisms. The weak payoff monotonicity hypothesis fares well in data,
but violations of it can be spotted in particular environments. These violations do not
hinder the main conclusions of our study, however.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Let Γ ≡ (M,ϕ, p) and σ ∈ N(Γ) be as in the statement of the lemma.
Consider a sequence of weakly payoff monotone distributions for Γ, {σλ}λ∈N, such that for
each i ∈ N and each θi ∈ Ti, as λ → ∞, σλ(·|θi) → σ(·|θi). Let λ ∈ N and m−i ∈ M−i.
Since mi is a weakly dominant action for agent i with type θi in (M,ϕ), for each ri ∈ Mi,
ui(ϕ(m−i,mi)|θi) ≥ ui(ϕ(m−i, ri)|θi). Thus, Uϕ(σλ−i, δmi |p, θi) ≥ Uϕ(σλ−i, δri |p, θi). Since
σ is weakly payoff monotone for Γ, we have that for each ri ∈ Mi, σλi (mi|θi) ≥ σλi (ri|θi).
Convergence implies that σi(mi|θi) ≥ σi(ri|θi). Thus, mi is in the support of σi(·|θi).
Proof of Theorems 1 and 4. We prove Theorem 4, which implies Theorem 1. We first prove
that statement 3 in the theorem implies statement 2. Suppose that g is strategy-proof and
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non-bossy in welfare-outcome. Let p be a common prior and σ an empirical equilibrium
of (Θ, g, p). Let θ ∈ Θ be in the support of p. Thus, for each i ∈ N , p(θ−i|θi) > 0. Let
τ ∈ Θ be in the support of σ(·|θ), i.e., τ is a report that is observed with positive probability
when the true types are θ. Let i ∈ N . Since σ ∈ N(Θ, g, p), we have that
Ug(σ−i, δτi |p, θi) ≥ Ug(σ−i, δθi |p, θi).
Since g is strategy-proof, the integrand of the expression on the right dominates point-wise
the integrand of the expression on the left. Thus, the integrands are equal on the support
of the common integrating measure. Notice that since p(θ−i|θi) > 0 and τ is in the support
of σ(·|θ), agent i assigns positive probability that the other agents profile of reports is τ−i.
Thus, ui(g(τ)|θi) = ui(g(τ−i, θi)|θi). Since g is non-bossy in welfare-outcome,
g(τ) = g(τ−i, θi). (1)
By Lemma 1, θi is in the support of σi(·|θi). Thus, (τ−i, θi) is in the support of σ(·|θ).
Thus, the recursive argument shows that g(τ) = g(θ).
We now prove that statement 2 implies statement 1. Since each empirical equilibrium
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, statement 2 implies that for each common prior p there is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (Θ, g, p) that obtains for each θ ∈ Θ, g(θ) with probability
one. It is well known that this implies g is strategy-proof (Dasgupta et al., 1979; Bergemann
and Morris, 2005).28 Thus, (Θ, g) is a dominant strategies mechanism that satisfies the
conditions in statement 1 of the theorem.
We now prove that statement 1 implies statement 3. Suppose that statement 1 is
satisfied. That is, there is a finite mechanism (M,ϕ) for which each agent type has at least
a dominant strategy, and such that for each common prior p, each empirical equilibrium
σ of (M,ϕ, p), each possible type θ ∈ Θ in the support of p, and each message m in the
support of σ(·|θ), ϕ(m) = g(θ).
We prove that g is strategy-proof. For each i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi, let mi(θi) be a weakly
dominant action for i with type θi in (M,ϕ). Let p be a full-support common prior and σ
an empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, p). By Lemma 1, for each i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi, mi(θi) is
in the support of σ(·|θi). By statement 1, for each θ ∈ Θ, ϕ(m(θ)) = g(θ) (this means that
(M,ϕ) fully implements g in dominant strategy equilibria, which by the usual revelation
principle argument, which we spell out next, implies g is strategy-proof). Let θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N
and τi ∈ Θi. Since mi(θi) is a weakly dominant action for i with type θi in (M,ϕ), we
28This can be easily seen by analyzing for each θ ∈ Θ and τi ∈ Θi, the common prior p = (1/2)δθ +
(1/2)δ(θ−i,τi). See Theorem 2 for the explicit proof of a slightly stronger result where this is obtained for
interior common priors.
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have that ui(ϕ(m(θ)|θi) ≥ ui(ϕ(m−i(θ−i),mi(τi))|θi). Thus, ui(g(θ)|θi) ≥ ui(g(θ−i, τi)|θi).
Thus, g is strategy-proof.
We prove that g is non-bossy in welfare-outcome. Suppose by contradiction that there
is θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ N , and τi ∈ Θi such that ui(g(θ)|θi) = ui(g(θ−i, τi)|θi) and g(θ) 6= g(θ−i, τi).
Suppose without loss of generality that this agent is i = 1. Let a ≡ g(θ) and b ≡ g(θ−1, τ1).
Again, for each i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi, let mi(θi) be a weakly dominant action for i with type
θi in (M,ϕ). We claim that m1(τ1) is a best response to m−1(θ−1) for agent i with type θ1,
i.e., for each m′1 ∈M1,
u1(ϕ(m−1(θ−1),m1(τ1))|θ1) ≥ u1(ϕ(m−1(θ−1),m′1)|θ1). (2)
By Lemma 1, in each empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, (θ−1, τ1)), (m−1(θ−1),m1(τ1)) is played
with positive probability and in each empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, θ), (m−1(θ−1),m1(θ1))
is played with positive probability. Since (M,ϕ) satisfies statement 1, ϕ(m−1(θ−1),m1(τ1)) =
b and ϕ(m−1(θ−1),m1(θ)) = a. Since m1(θ1) is a dominant strategy for agent 1 with type θ1,
we have that for eachm′1 ∈M1, u1(ϕ(m−1(θ−1),m1(τ1))|θ1) = u1(ϕ(m−1(θ−1),m1(θ1))|θ1) ≥
u1(ϕ(m−1(θ−1),m′1)|θ1). This is (2).
Consider the complete information game (M,ϕ, θ). Let σ∗ be the profile of strategies
in (M,ϕ, θ) defined as follows. For each agent j 6= 1, σ∗j uniformly randomizes among j’s
weakly dominant actions; agent 1 uniformly randomizes among her best responses to σ∗−1.
(Recall that in a complete information game we do not condition strategies on agents’ types,
i.e., σ∗i is the strategy of agent i with type θi.) Clearly, σ
∗ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of (M,ϕ, θ). Since m−1(θ−1) in (2) is an arbitrary profile of weakly dominant strategies for
agents N \ {i} with type θ−1 in (M,ϕ), we have that for agent i with type θ1, m1(τ1) is a
best response to σ∗−1 in (M,ϕ, θ), i.e., for each m′1 ∈M1,
Uϕ(σ
∗
−i, δm1(τ1)|δθ−1 , θi) ≥ Uϕ(σ∗−i, δm′1 |δθ−1 , θi).
Thus, (m−1(θ−1),m1(τ1)) is in the support of σ∗. Thus, σ∗ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of (M,ϕ, θ) that obtains with positive probability outcome b = ϕ(m−1(θ−1),m1(τ1)) (when
the agents’ type is θ, which is the only element in the support of the prior).
The proof concludes by showing that σ∗ is an empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, θ), which
contradicts statement 1 because b 6= a. We follow the intuition that we presented in Sec. 5
for the direct revelation mechanism (Θ, g).
We will make use of the Quantal Response Equilibria (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995),
which are weakly payoff monotone distributions. A quantal response function for agent i
is a continuous function Qi : RMi → ∆(Mi). For each mi ∈ Mi, Qimi(x) denotes the value
32
assigned to mi by Qi(x). We refer to the list Q ≡ (Qi)i∈N simply as a quantal response
function. Agent i’s quantal response function Qi is monotone if for each x ∈ RMi , and each
pair {mi,m′i} ⊆ Mi such that xmi > xm′i , Qimi(x) > Qim′i(x) (Goeree et al., 2005). The
logistic quantal response function with parameter λ ≥ 0, denoted by lλ, assigns to each
m ∈Mi and each x ∈ RMi the value,
lλim(x) ≡
eλxm∑
t∈Mi e
λxt
. (3)
It can easily be checked that for each λ ≥ 0, the corresponding logistic quantal response
function is continuous and monotone (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). A quantal response
equilibrium of Γ ≡ (M,ϕ, θ) with respect to quantal response function Q is a fixed point
of the composition of Q and the expected payoff operator in Γ (McKelvey and Palfrey,
1995), i.e., a strategy profile for (M,ϕ, θ), σ ≡ (σi)i∈N , such that for each i ∈ N , σi =
Qi(Uϕ(σ−i, δmi |δθ−i , θi)mi∈Mi). Brouwer’s fixed point theorem guarantees that for each
continuous quantal response function there is a quantal response equilibrium associated
with it (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). One can easily see that if the quantal response
function is monotone, each of its quantal response equilibria are weakly payoff monotone.
For each j ∈ N , ε ∈ (0, 1), and λ ∈ N let nj ≡ |Mj | and κε,λj the quantal response
function that for each x ∈ RMj ,
κε,λj (x) ≡ ε/nj + (1− ε)lλ(x).
Since lλ is continuous and monotone, so is κε,λj . Fix ε > 0, δ > 0, and r ∈ N. By continuity
of κε,r1 and the expected utility operator, as η → 0,
κε,r1 (Uϕ((η/nj + (1− η)σ∗j )i∈N\{1}, δm1 |δθ−1 , θ1)m1∈M1)→ κε,r1 (Uϕ(σ∗−1, δm1 |, θ1)m1∈M1).
By monotonicity of κε,r1 , κ
ε,r
1 (Uϕ(σ
∗−1, δm1 |, θ1)m1∈M1) places maximal probability on the
best responses for agent 1 to σ∗−1. Thus there is η(ε, r, δ) < δ such that for each m∗1 ∈ M1
that is a best response for agent 1 to σ∗−1, the distance between
κε,r1m∗1
(Uϕ((η(ε, r, δ)/nj + (1− η(ε, r, δ))σ∗j )i∈N\{1}, δm1 |δθ−1 , θ1)m1∈M1))
and
κε,r1m1(θ1)(Uϕ((η(ε, r, δ)/nj + (1− η(ε, r, δ))σ
∗
j )i∈N\{1}, δm1 |δθ−1 , θ1)m1∈M1)),
is at most δ/2. Fix such a η(ε, r, δ). Consider a sequence of quantal response equilibria for
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the sequence of quantal response functions
{(κε,r1 , κη(ε,r,δ),t2 , ..., κη(ε,r,δ),tn )}t∈N.
Let {σt}t∈N be this sequence. Compactness of the simplex of probabilities implies that
there is a convergent subsequence. Without loss of generality we assume then that {σt}t∈N
is convergent and its limit as t → ∞ is, say σ. Since each agent places in each action a
probability that is at least the minimum between ε/n1 and min{η(ε, r, δ)/nj : j ∈ N \ {1}},
σ is interior. Now, observe that for each t ∈ N, each j ∈ N \ {1}, and each m′j ∈Mj ,
ltm′j
(Uϕ(σ
t
−j , δmj |δθ−j , θj)mj∈Mj )
ltmj(θj)(Uϕ(σ
t
−j , δmj |δθ−j , θj)mj∈Mj )
= e
t(Uϕ(σt−j ,δmj |δθ−j ,θj)−Uϕ(σt−j ,δmj(θj)|δθ−j ,θj)).
Suppose that m′j is not a dominant action for j in (M,ϕ). Since σ−j is interior, we have
that
Uϕ(σ−j , δmj |δθ−j , θj)− Uϕ(σ−j , δmj(θ)|δθ−j , θj) < 0.
Since as t→∞, σt → σ, we also have that as t→∞,
ltm′j
(Uϕ(σ
t
−j , δmj |δθ−j , θj)mj∈Mj )
ltmj(θj)(Uϕ(σ
t
−j , δmj |δθ−j , θj)mj∈Mj )
→ 0. (4)
By monotonicity of lt, lt(Uϕ(σ
t
−j , δmj |, θj)mj∈M1) places maximal probability on the best
responses for agent j to σt−j . Thus, it places maximal probability on mj(θj). Since as
t→∞, σt → σ, the expressions in the numerator and denominator of (4) form convergent
sequences. Thus, limt→∞ ltmj(θj)(Uϕ(σ
t
−j , δmj |δθ−j , θj)mj∈Mj ) ≥ 1/nj > 0. By (4), as t→∞,
ltm′j
(Uϕ(σ
t
−j , δmj |δθ−j , θj)mj∈Mj )→ 0. Thus, σj = η(ε, r, δ)/n+ (1− η(ε, r, δ))σ∗j .
Now, for agent 1, since both parameters in her quantal response function are fixed in
the sequence,
σ1 = κ
ε,r
1 (Uϕ((η(ε, r, δ)/nj + (1− η(ε, r, δ))σ∗j )i∈N\{1}, δm1 |δθ−1 , θ1)m1∈M1).
Thus, there is t > r such that the max distance, between σt and σ is δ/4. Let γε,r,δ = σt
for such a t. By our choice of η(ε, r, δ), for each m∗1 ∈ M1 that is a best response to
σ∗−1 for agent 1 with type θ1, the distance between κ
ε,r
1m∗1
(Uϕ(γ
r−1, δm1 |δθ−1 , θ1)m1∈M1) and
κε,r1m1(θ1)(Uϕ(γ
r
−i, δm1 |δθ−1 , θ1)m1∈M1) is at most δ.
For each r ∈ N, let ε(r) ≡ 1/r and δ(r) ≡ 1/r. Let η(r) ≡ η(ε(r), r, δ(r)) and γr ≡
γε(r),r,δ(r) be constructed as above. By passing to a subsequence if necessary we can suppose
without loss of generality that {γr}r∈N is convergent. Since 0 < η(r) < 1/r, we have that
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as r → ∞, η(r) → 0. Let j 6= 1. By our construction, the maximum distance between γrj
and η(r)/n+ (1− η(r))σ∗j is at most δ(r)/4. Thus, as r →∞, γrj → σ∗j .
Let µ1 be the limit as r →∞ of γr1 . For each m∗1 ∈M1 that is a best response for θ1 to
σ∗−1, we have that |γr1(m∗1) − γr1(m1(θ1)| ≤ δ(r). Thus, µ1(m∗1) = µ1(m1(θ1)). Since κε,r1 is
monotone, µ1(m1(θ1)) > 0. Now, observe that for each r ∈ N, and each m′1 ∈M1,
lrm′1
(Uϕ(γ
r−1, δm1 |δθ−1 , θ1)m1∈M1)
lrm1(θ1)(Uϕ(γ
r−1, δm1 |δθ−1 , θ1)m1∈M1)
= er(Uϕ(γ
r
−1,δm1 |δθ−1 ,θ1)−Uϕ(γr−1,δm1(θ1)|δθ−1 ,θ1)).
If m′1 ∈M1 is not a best response to σ∗−1,
Uϕ(σ
∗
−1, δm1 |δθ−1 , θ1) < Uϕ(σ∗−1, δm1(θ1)|δθ−1 , θ1).
Thus, µ1(m
′
1)/µ1(m1(θ1)) = 0 and µ1(m
′
1) = 0. Thus, µ1 = σ
∗
1. Since each γ
r is weakly
payoff monotone and as r → ∞, γr → σ∗, we have that σ∗ is an empirical equilibrium of
(M,ϕ, θ).
Proof of Theorem 2. Suppose that statement 1 is satisfied. We claim that g is strategy-
proof. Our proof of this claim follows Bergemann and Morris (2005, Proposition 3). We
spell out the details because our statement includes mixed strategy equilibria. Let θ ∈ Θ,
i ∈ N , and τi ∈ Θi. Let ε ∈ (0, 1). Consider the common prior p that places probability
1/2−ε/2 on each element of {θ, (θ−i, τi)}, and places uniform probability on all other payoff
types. Thus, p has full-support. Let σ be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (Θ, g, p) such
that for each µ ∈ Θ and each message in the support of σ(·|µ) produces g(µ). Thus, the
expected value of a report in the support of σi(·|θi) has an expected value for type θi that
is greater than or equal to the expected value of a report in the support of σi(·|τi), i.e.,
p(θ−i|θi)ui(g(θ)|θi) +
∑
µ−i∈θ−i p(µ−i|θi)ui(g(µ−i, θi)|θi) ≥
p(θ−i|θi)ui(g(θ−i, τi)|θi) +
∑
µ−i∈θ−i p(µ−i|θi)ui(g(µ−i, τi)|θi).
Since as ε → 0, p(θ−i|θi) → 1, we have that ui(g(θ)|θi) ≥ ui(g(θ−i, τi)|θi). Thus, g is
strategy-proof.
We now claim that g has essentially unique dominant strategies. Suppose by contra-
diction that there are i ∈ N , θ ∈ Θ, τi ∈ Θi, such that ui(g(θ)|θi) = ui(g(θ−i, τi)|θi),
g(θ) 6= g(θ−i, τi), and for each τ−i ∈ Θ−i, ui(g(τ−i, θi)|θi) ≤ ui(g(τ)|θi). Let p have full
support. Let σ be an empirical equilibrium of (Θ, g, p). Since g is strategy-proof, τi is a
weakly dominant action for agent i with type θi in (Θ, g), and for each j ∈ N \ {i}, θj is a
dominant strategy for agent j with type θj . By Lemma 1, σ(·|θ) places positive probability
on (θ−i, τi). This contradicts statement 1 in the theorem.
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Suppose now that g is strategy-proof and has essentially unique dominant strategies.
Let p have full support and σ be an empirical equilibrium of (Θ, g, p). Let θ ∈ Θ. We
prove that σ(·|θ) obtains g(θ) with probability one. Let i ∈ N . Suppose that τi is in the
support of σi(·|θi). We first prove that for each τ−i ∈ Θ−i, g(τ−i, θi) = g(τ−i, τi). Since σ is
a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Ug(δτi , σ−i|p, θi) ≥ Ug(δθi , σ−i|p, θi).
Since g is strategy-proof, the integrand of the expression on the right dominates point-wise
the integrand of the expression on the left. Thus, the integrands are equal on the support of
the common integrating measure. Since p(τ−i|θi) > 0 and since by Lemma 1 the probability
with which τ−i is realized for σ−i(·|τ−i) is positive, we have that
ui(g(τ−i, τi)|θi) = ui(g(τ−i, θi)|θi). (5)
We claim that g(τ−i, τi) = g(τ−i, θi). Suppose by contradiction that
g(τ−i, τi) 6= g(τ−i, θi). This means that θi 6= τi. Since g has essentially unique dominant
strategies, there is µ−i ∈ Θ−i such that ui(g(µ−i, θi)|θi) > ui(g(µ−i, τi)|θi). This contradicts
(5), which holds for arbitrary τ−i ∈ Θ−i.
Let τ ∈ Θ be in the support of σ(·|θ). Then g(τ) = g(τ−i, θi). By Lemma 1, θi is in the
support of σi(·|θi). Thus, (τ−i, θi) is also in the support of σ(·|θ). By iterating for the other
agents we get that g(τ) = g(θ).
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Student Proposing Deferred Acceptance rule (SPDA) has es-
sentially unique dominant strategies
The following discussion uses the standard language in school choice problems (c.f. Ab-
dulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003). Suppose that preferences are strict and starting from a
profile in which student i is truthful, she changes her report but does not change the relative
ranking of her assignment with respect to the other assignments. The SPDA assignment for
the first profile, say m, is again stable for the second profile. Thus, for the new profile, each
other agent is weakly better off. Agent i’s allotment is the same in both markets because
SPDA is strategy-proof. If another agent changes her allotment, it is because the new SPDA
assignment was blocked in the original profile. Since the preferences of the other agents did
not change, agent i needs to be in the blocking pair for the new assignment in the original
market. However, this means she is in a blocking pair for the new assignment in the new
market. Thus, with this type of lie, agent i cannot change the allotment of anybody else.
If agent i changes the relative ranking of her allotment in the original market, she can be
worse off with the lie. For instance, suppose that she moves mj from her lower contour set
at her allotment to the upper contour set. In the preference profile in which each agent
different from i and j ranks top her allotment at m, and in which agent j ranks mi top,
agent i receives mj in the SPDA assignment.
Robust Nash implementation
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that statement 1 is satisfied. Our argument in the proof of
Theorem 2, taking σ as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (M,ϕ, p) for the interior p defined
there, implies that g is strategy proof. We now prove that g is non-bossy in welfare-outcome
and satisfies the outcome rectangular property. Our proof follows closely that of Adachi
(Proposition 3, 2014). By Saijo et al. (Proposition 3, 2007), it is enough to prove that for
1
each pair {θ, θ′} ⊆ Θ, if for each i ∈ N , ui(g(θ′)|θi) = ui(g(θ′−i, θi)|θi), then g(θ) = g(θ′).
Thus, let {θ, θ′} ⊆ Θ, and suppose that for each i ∈ N ,
ui(g(θ
′)|θi) = ui(g(θ′−i, θi)|θi). (6)
Consider a prior p that places uniform probability on the set {(θ′−i, µi) : i ∈ N,µi ∈
{θi, θ′i}}. Let σ be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of (M,ϕ, p), which always exists because
the mechanism is finite. Let i ∈ N , mi in the support of σi(·|θi), m′i in the support of
σi(·|θ′i), and mˆ−i in the support of σ−i(·|θ′−i). By statement 1,
ϕ(mˆ−i,m′i) = g(θ
′) and ϕ(mˆ−i,mi) = g(θ′−i, θi). (7)
Thus, by (6),∑
mˆ−i∈M−i
ui(ϕ(mˆ−i,mi)|θi)σ−i(·|θ′−i) =
∑
mˆ−i∈M−i
ui(ϕ(mˆ−i,m′i)|θi)σ−i(·|θ′−i).
Since agent i knows the type of the other agents is θ′−i when she draws type θi, equilibrium
behavior implies that for each mˆi ∈Mi,∑
mˆ−i∈M−i
ui(ϕ(mˆ−i,mi)|θi)σ−i(·|θ′−i) ≥
∑
mˆ−i∈M−i
ui(ϕ(mˆ−i, mˆi)|θi)σ−i(·|θ′−i).
By the last two displayed equations, for each mˆi ∈Mi,∑
mˆ−i∈M−i
ui(ϕ(mˆ−i,m′i)|θi)σ−i(·|θ′−i) ≥
∑
mˆ−i∈M−i
ui(ϕ(mˆ−i, mˆi)|θi)σ−i(·|θ′−i).
Thus, if µ is a behavior strategy such that µ(·|θ) = σ(·|θ′), for each mˆi ∈Mi,∑
mˆ−i∈M−i
ui(ϕ(mˆ−i,m′i)|θi)µ−i(·|θ−i) ≥
∑
mˆ−i∈M−i
ui(ϕ(mˆ−i, mˆi)|θi)µ−i(·|θ−i).
Thus, µ is a Nash equilibrium of (M,ϕ, θ). By statement 1, ϕ(m′) = g(θ). Thus, g(θ) =
g(θ′).
Finally, we show that statement 1 follows from statement 2. Let σ be a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of (Θ, g, p) for some common prior p. Let θ in the support of p and τ be in
the support of σ(·|θ). Observe that equation (1) in our proof of Theorem 1 holds when g
is strategy-proof and non-bossy in welfare-outcome. Thus, for each i ∈ N , g(τ−i, θi) = g(τ).
Then, by the outcome rectangular property, we have that g(τ) = g(θ).
2
Social choice correspondences
We now show that our results depend on our restriction to social choice functions. That
is, our requirement that the social planner’s objective be summarized on a function that
selects a unique determinate outcome for each social state. Since mixed strategy equilibria
are essential in our analysis, a generalization of our model requires that we first reconsider
the role of mixed strategies in Bayesian implementation. Indeed, in some environments,
almost all pure strategy equilibria of a mechanism may be completely wiped out by the
empirical equilibrium refinement, while a continuum of mixed strategy equilibria survive
(Velez and Brown, 2019a).
An alternative that we find appealing as a starting point is to study typical Bayesian
implementation (Jackson, 1991) in a finitely generated model in which the social planner
selects probability measures on outcomes for each social state. More precisely, for a finite
outcome space X let Θ be a payoff type space as defined in our model. A (random)
social choice function associates with each type profile a probability distribution on X, i.e.,
g : Θ → ∆(X). A mechanism (M,ϕ) is defined as usual, but allowing for randomization,
i.e., ϕ : M → ∆(X). A (random) social choice set G is a subset of social choice functions.
Then one can determine the success of a mechanism from the point of view of a mechanism
designer who identifies G as desirable by comparing the equilibria of (M,ϕ, p) with the
elements of G.
The following example shows that strategy-proofness is not necessary to obtain a mean-
ingful form of robust implementation in empirical equilibrium when one allows for multi-
valued objectives. That is, one can construct a finite X and a payoff-type space Θ that
admits a social choice set G that contains no strategy-proof scf and for which there is a
finite mechanism (M,ϕ) such that for each common prior p and each empirical equilibrium
of (M,ϕ, p), say σ, there is an element of G that coincides with the induced conditional
measures θ 7→ ϕ(σ(·|θ)) in the support of p.
Example 2. Consider the following modification of Bergemann and Morris (2005, Example
2): Θ1 ≡ {θ1, θ′1, θ′′1}, Θ2 ≡ {θ2, θ′2}, X ≡ ∆({a, b, c, d, a′, b′, c′, d′}),
u1 a b c d a
′ b′ c′ d′
θ1 1 -1 1/2− ε -1 -1 1 -1 1/2− ε
θ′1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
θ′′1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
and
3
u2 a b c d a
′ b′ c′ d′
θ2 ε 1 0 0 0 1− ε −1 −1
θ′2 1− ε 0 −1 −1 1 ε 0 0
Let F be the correspondence that assigns to each type profile the set of probability distri-
butions on outcomes in the following table.
θ2 θ
′
2
θ1 ∆({a, b}) ∆({a′, b′})
θ′1 {c} {c′}
θ′′1 {d} {d′}
Let G be the social choice set of all scfs g such that for each θ, g(θ) ∈ F (θ).
An argument as that in Bergemann and Morris (2005) shows that if ε < (9 −√65)/8,
there is no strategy-proof scf g such that for each θ ∈ Θ, g(θ) ∈ F (θ). Thus, there is no
strategy-proof scf in G.
Finally, let (M,ϕ) be the mechanism where M1 ≡ {m11,m21,m31,m41}, M2 ≡ {m12,m22},
and ϕ is given by:
m11 m
2
1 m
3
1 m
4
1
m12 a b c d
m22 a
′ b′ c′ d′
Consider a common prior p. Observe that m12 is strictly dominant for payoff type θ2 and m
2
2
is strictly dominant for payoff type θ′2. Thus, in each Nash equilibrium of (M,ϕ, p) these
payoff types play these strategies with probability one. Now, consider agent 1 with type θ1.
Clearly, m11 weakly dominates m
3
1 and m
2
1 weakly dominates m
4
1. Moreover, if the expected
value of m11 is the same as that for m
3
1, we have that the expected value of m
2
1 is greater
than that of m41. Thus, agent 1 with type θ1 will never play m
1
3 nor m
4
1 in a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of (M,ϕ, p). Note also that agent 1 with types θ′1 and θ′′1 has strictly dominant
actions m31 and m
4
1, respectively. Thus, for each p, each empirical equilibrium of (M,ϕ, p),
say σ, and each realization of payoff types θ ∈ Θ, σ(·|θ) induces a measure on X that
belongs to F (θ).
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